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SECTION 1983 AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE
EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
ROBERT E. BACHARACH*
The recent explosion of litigation involving section 1983 has generated con-
siderable debate among courts and commentators.' In 1984 a subcommittee
of the United States Judicial Conference proposed an administrative exhaus-
tion requirement in section 1983 cases that would require a plaintiff to ex-
haust any available state administrative procedures before bringing suit in
federal court. 2 The proposal, however, was tabled in 1985 and the absence of
such a requirement in section 1983 cases remains unchanged. Nevertheless,
the movement to reform section 1983 should not be abandoned. The utiliza-
tion of state administrative resources in section 1983 cases would help con-
serve scarce judicial resources and alleviate needless friction between state
agencies and the federal judiciary.
Background
The "no-exhaustion rule" is the accidental by-product of several conflict-
ing United States Supreme Court decisions. Before 1963, the Court had
strongly suggested that the exhaustion of administrative remedies was re-
quired in section 1983 cases. In Lane v. Wilson,' for example, the plaintiff
sought damages from state officials who had denied him the right to vote.
The plaintiff sued under section 43 of title 8 of the United States Code,
which was the previous codification of section 1983. The defendants argued
© 1987 Robert E. Bacharach
* J.D., Washington University; Law Clerk to the Honorable William J. Holloway, Jr.,
Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The author currently serves as
an associate at Crowe & Dunlevy in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.-Ed.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizens of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this sec-
tion, any act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
2. The proposal provides as follows: "No action, suit, or proceeding under this section
shall be maintained in any court of the United States until the plaintiff shall have exhausted any
presently available state administrative procedures that would afford a plain, speedy, and ade-
quate remedy for the alleged wrong." Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State
Prisoners under Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IowA L. REV. 935, 952 n.96 (1986)
(quoting REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENDA OF COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 9, Sept. 9, 1985).
3. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
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that federal relief was unavailable because the plaintiff had not exhausted his
administrative remedies. The Supreme Court rejected this defense. In doing
so, the Court distinguished between judicial and administrative remedies and
held that exhaustion of state judicial remedies was not a prerequisite to
federal judicial relief.' The implication, of course, was that a different result
would be reached if administrative remedies were involved.
Relying on Lane, most lower federal courts required exhaustion of state
administrative, but not judicial, remedies in cases brought under section
1983.1 Requiring administrative exhaustion became suspect in 1961, however,
when the Supreme Court returned to the Lane issue in Monroe v. Pape.' In
Monroe the plaintiffs alleged that thirteen police officers ransacked their
home, abused them physically and verbally, and detained one of the oc-
cupants on "open charges" for ten hours.7 The Monroe Court held that
damages under section 1983 are available even though the plaintiff has not
exhausted his state judicial remedies. Although that issue had already been
settled in Lane, the Monroe Court held in much broader terms: "The federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first
sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." 8 In its holding the
Court relied on the three purposes of section 1983: (1) to override certain
state laws; (2) to provide a remedy when state law was inadequate; and (3) to
provide a federal remedy when the state remedy, though adequate in theory,
was not available in practice.9
Two years later, the Supreme Court extended the Lane doctrine to state
administrative remedies in McNeese v. Board of Education.'I In McNeese the
plaintiffs requested a federal court to order desegregation of a local school
system. However, under applicable state law, the plaintiffs could have ob-
tained state administrative relief by filing a complaint with the Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction. The defendants argued that if such a complaint
had been filed, the Superintendent might have requested the Attorney
General to litigate on behalf of the aggrieved residents or refused to certify
claims by the schools for state aid." The district court dismissed the com-
plaint, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative
remedies available under state law.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state administrative remedy
was inadequate. The Court's rationale, however, is ambiguous. The opinion
4. Id. at 274.
5. See Dove v Parham, 282 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1960); Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1959); Baron v. O'Sullivan, 258 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1958);
Williams v. Dalton, 231 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1956); Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951).
6. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7. Id. at 169.
8. Id. at 183.
9. Id. at 174-75.
10. 373 U.S. 6(8 (1963).




does suggest that section 1983 provides an alternative remedy to those
available under state law.' 2 The Court stressed, though, that the state ad-
ministrative remedy was inadequate, noting that state law did not authorize
the Superintendent to take corrective action or to withhold funds from the
segregated school districts.' 3
The McNeese decision did not address the question of whether exhaustion
was required when an adequate administrative remedy was available.1 4 Thus,
the opinion is unremarkable in itself because it had long been settled that ex-
haustion was not required unless the administrative remedy was adequate.' 5
Nevertheless, most of the circuit courts relied on McNeese for the proposi-
tion that administrative exhaustion was never required in section 1983 litiga-
tion. 16
In the following two decades, the Supreme Court added to the confusion
by summarily interpreting McNeese in this fashion."' Any uncertainty,
however, was removed in Patsy v. Board of Regents.'8 In Patsy, an employee
of a state university brought suit in federal court alleging that she had been
denied certain opportunities because of her race and sex. The trial court
12. The Court stated:
The right alleged is as plainly federal in origin and nature as those vindicated in
Brown v. Board of Education. Nor is the federal right in any way entangled in a
skein of state law that must be untangled before the federal case can proceed. For
petitioners assert that respondents have been and are depriving them of rights pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is immaterial whether respondents' con-
duct is legal or illegal as a matter of state law.
373 U.S. at 674 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 674-76.
14. See Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 418-19 & n.* (1967) (per curiam) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), rev'd,
457 U.S. 496 (1982); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1978); Eisen v. Eastman,
421 F.2d 560, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
15. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Board of Commn'rs, 247 U.S. 282 (1918); 4 K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAWv TREATISE § 26:11, at 464 (2d ed. 1983).
16. See, e.g., Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911
(1979); United States v. Lightcap, 567 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1977); Gillette v. McNichols, 517 F.2d
888 (10th Cir. 1975); McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 426 U.S.
471 (1976); Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1975); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972). But see Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 912 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
("adequate and appropriate state administrative remedies must be exhausted before a section
1983 action is permitted to proceed in federal court, absent any of the traditional exceptions to
the general exhaustion rule"), rev'd, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Jose v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865, 869
(2d Cir. 1982) (adhering to qualified administrative exhaustion requirement in section 1983
cases).
17. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972) (per curiam); Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (per
curiam); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 417
(1967) (per curiam).
18. 457 U.S. 496 (1982). Patsy does not address the availability of an exhaustion requirement
for those section 1983 cases brought in state court. See Caylor v. City of Red Bluff, 106 S.Ct.
605 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
1987] 409
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dismissed the claim because of her failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. 9 The Fifth Circuit remanded, holding that the plaintiff was re-
quired to exhaust only "adequate and appropriate" administrative remedies
and directed the district court to permit the plaintiff to amend her complaint
to determine if there are appropriate administrative remedies that plaintiff
should exhaust. 20 The Supreme Court again reversed, holding that exhaustion
of administrative remedies is never required in section 1983 cases. 2' Seven
members of the Court viewed the question as already having been decided by
McNeese.2 2 Only Justices Powell and Burger believed the question was left
open by McNeese and its progeny. 23 They approved of the Fifth Circuit's ap-
proach, concluding that a flexible exhaustion requirement would further the
principles of comity and conserve scarce judicial resources.2" The majority,
however, did not address the policy considerations surrounding the debate,
concluding that the desirability of an exhaustion requirement should be
decided by Congress rather than by the courts.
2
1
It is clear from Patsy that the Supreme Court believes the "no-exhaustion
rule" is consistent with Congress' intent. It is equally clear, however, that the
Supreme Court has arrived at this conclusion by a nineteen-year process of
distorting the McNeese decision.
26
The Setting for the Controversy
It is now time for Congress to reconsider the exhaustion requirement,
given the recent explosion of section 1983 litigation and the resultant drain
19. Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), rev'd, 457 U.S.
496 (1982).
20. 634 F.2d at 914.
21. 457 U.S. at 516.
22. Id. at 50-01 (majority opinion), 516-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 517 (White, J., con-
curring). The majority opinion stated: "[This Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is
not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983, and we have not deviated from that position in the
19 years since McNeese. Therefore, we do not address the question presented in this case as one
of first impression." Id. at 500-01.
23. Id. at 532 (Powell, J., dissenting). "[In all the cases in which the Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated its no-exhaustion rule, the state administrative remedies were sufficiently inadequate
that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event." Id. at n.18 (quoting
Developments in the Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1274 (1977)).
24. 457 U.S. at 532-33.
25. [P]olicy considerations alone cannot justify judicially imposed exhaustion unless
exhaustion is consistent with congressional intent. Furthermore, as the debates
over incorporating the exhaustion requirement in § 1997e demonstrate, the relevant
policy considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and there is vehe-
ment disagreement over the validity of the assumptions underlying many of them.
The very difficulty of these policy considerations, and Congress' superior, institu-
tional competence to pursue this debate, suggests that legislative, not judicial, solu-
tions are preferable.
Id. at 513 (citations omitted). See also id. at 517 (Justice O'Connor's concurrence urging Con-
gress to adopt exhaustion requirement in section 1983 cases).
26. See City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 910-11 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss3/13
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on judicial resources. In 1961, when Monroe was decided, only 270 civil
rights actions were filed in federal district courts.27 In 1986, 20,128 civil
rights cases were brought in federal court.28 An illustration of the problem
appears in McCray v. Burrell.29 In McCray a state prisoner instituted four-
teen separate section 1983 actions in a single year. Chief Judge Northrop
estimated that these cases would take as much as 20 to 25 percent of his time
for the 1973 fiscal year. 30 The Burger Court viewed the situation with alarm,
searching for ways to reduce the volume of section 1983 litigation in federal
courts . 3 Many judges have suggested the exhaustion doctrine as one such
method.3 2 Certainly the proposal to amend section 1983 would alleviate some
of the burdens presently shouldered by federal judges.
Critics of the exhaustion requirement, however, argue that section 1983
cases deserve special attention from the federal courts. 33 The vindication of
federal rights is the province of federal courts, but the argument
misconceives the nature of an administrative exhaustion requirement. Such a
requirement would merely postpone the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
34
Once the administrative agency issues an adverse ruling, the litigant can pur-
sue his claim in federal court. The court can then vindicate the plaintiff's
federal rights without regard to the agency's contrary decision, for the prior
determination does not create res judicata or collateral estoppel effects.
3 5
The only consequence of the exhaustion requirement will be that some
litigants cannot immediately seek relief in federal court. It is unclear,
however, why immediate federal adjudication of all civil rights claims is
from the denial of certiorari); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186 n.* (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring). In any event, a majority of the Court seem uneasy about the result, for the six
Justices in Patsy suggested that Congress consider the problem.
27. 457 U.S. at 533 (Powell, J., dissenting).
28. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS: 1986, at 168.
29. 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973), rev'd, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed,
426 U.S. 471 (1976) (mem.).
30. Id. at 1195.
31. See W. BURGER, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 5-10 (1981) (proposals to reduce
filings in federal courts); O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State
Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 808-10 (1981)
(endorsing limitations on the scope of section 1983).
32. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 517 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). See also id. at 533 (Powell, J., dissenting); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW 101 (1973).
33. See Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1357 (1970);
Recent Decisions, Exhaustion of Adequate and Appropriate State Administrative Remedies is a
Prerequisite for Judicial Review under Section 1983, 53 Miss. L.J. 283, 297 (1980); Note, Ex-
haustion of State Administrative Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 8 IND. L. REV. 565,
586-87 (1975).
34. 457 U.S. at 532 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v.
McNary, 454 U.S. I00, 136 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (administrative exhaustion require-
ment in section 1983 cases concerned merely with "the deferral of federal court consideration").
35. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 230 (1908); 1 C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ACm § 235, at 398 (2d ed. 1980).
1987]
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necessary.36 When an adequate administrative remedy is available, the
litigant can obtain immediate relief from the agency. If no such remedy ex-
ists, he can immediately pursue his claim in federal court. The relevant in-
quiry, then, should be whether the agency is capable of protecting the
litigant's federal rights. The proposal to amend section 1983, by incor-
porating this test, would preserve the federal judiciary's proper role in sec-
tion 1983 litigation.
Reasons for Requiring Exhaustion: The Policies
The McNeese-Patsy doctrine is an anomaly. In cases other than those in-
volving section 1983, the federal courts have long adhered to the exhaustion
principle " The deference accorded state administrative agencies has not been
an unthinking one.
The requirement for exhaustion of state administrative remedies, in con-
texts other than section 1983 cases, is largely attributable to its favorable ef-
fect on judicial economy.38 An administrative exhaustion requirement would
have an identical effect in the context of section 1983 litigation.3 9
The most striking impact on judicial administration, of course, will be
realized when the administrative agency resolves the dispute in the complain-
ant's favor. Such a result would eliminate the need for judicial action.40 Even
without such a result, the federal court would benefit from the agency's in-
itial review. The agency's decision would provide a factual record that the
court could consult in making its own findings.42  Certainly the agency's
preparation of a factual record would save precious judicial time. Moreover,
it would hell) ensure more accurate fact finding in many cases. In Bradley v.
Weinberger, 12 Chief Judge Coffin noted:
36. See Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41
U. CHI. L. REv. 537, 548 (1974). Some courts and commentators argue that an exhaustion re-
quirement, by delaying federal intervention, would discourage aggrieved individuals from seek-
ing vindication of their rights. See, e.g., Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 916 (5th Cir.
1981) (en, bane) (Rabin, J., dissenting), rev'd, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). See also id. at 925 (Hatchett,
J., dissenting); Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM.
L. REv. 1201, 1207 (1968). The premise is that these individuals harbor such significant suspi-
cions about state agencies and have so few resources that they would elect to drop their claims
completely. The premise is based on little more than conjecture. Even if such suspicions exist,
state administratie agencies provide a less expensive and less time-consuming forum than
federal courts. See Note, supra note 33, at 567 (1975). Moreover, a litigant should not be able to
deliberately bypass the administrative forum simply because he prefers a federal forum. See L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 452 (1965); Comment, Exhaustion of
State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, supra, at 541 n.20. In fact, such a path
is encouraged by the no-exhaustion rule.
37. See Mcr(art v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969)); Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
38. See, e.g., Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410, 415 (1st Cir. 1973).
39. See Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1265-66; Note, supra note 33, at 567.
40. See Pat;y v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 911 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 496
(1982).
41. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969).




The exhaustion requirement, as it applies to administrative agen-
cies, is no mere technical rule to enable courts to avoid difficult
decisions. It is grounded in substantial concerns not only of
fairness and orderly procedure, but also of competence. Courts
are not best equipped to judge the merits of the scientific studies
and objections to them. Specialized agencies like the FDA are
created to serve that function.
4 3
The exhaustion requirement, in short, would take advantage of the expertise
of agency and court alike-the agency in resolving sometimes complicated
factual disputes and the judiciary in defining the boundaries of federal
rights."'
The availability of a factual record, however, would do more than improve
decision making by the courts; it would also result in improved decisions by
the agencies themselves. The present opportunity for immediate judicial relief
encourages litigants to bypass administrative procedures. The result is
counterproductive, for it removes the incentive, and occasionally the oppor-
tunity, for the agency to correct its own errors. The exhaustion requirement
would give the agencies such an incentive, for any errors would be fully ex-
posed to the courts.
45
The exhaustion requirement represents a sensible division of responsibility
between the courts and the agencies, while allocating authority more evenly
between the federal courts and the states. Section 1983 litigation creates in-
evitable tension because it consists of federal review over state action. The
exhaustion requirement would not remove this tension because federal courts
would still be reviewing the conduct of state actors. It would, however,
alleviate some of the friction by postponing federal review until the state ad-
ministrative process has run its course.
46
It is true that this effect would be partially offset by the proposal's
threshold requirement of an adequate state remedy. Under the new statute,
federal courts would review not only the propriety of state action but also the
adequacy of its administrative processes.47 The difficulty, however, is prob-
ably more apparent than real. Surely the states do not welcome the deliberate
flouting of their administrative processes. Moreover, the current rule subtly
43. Id. at 415. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 39, at 1265-66; Note, supra
note 33, at 567.
44. See Comment, Civil Rights: Eliminating the Exhaustion Requirement in Actions Brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 544, 546 (1983).
45. Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, supra
note 36, at 540. But see Note, supra note 33, at 587 ("arguable that agencies would not lose any
incentive to correct their own errors" as result of no-exhaustion rule).
46. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 532-33 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Comment, State Prisoners and the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Section
1983 Jurisprudence and the Availability of Adequate State Remedies, 7 SETON HALL L. REV.
366, 367 (1976); Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies under the Civil Rights Act, supra note
36, at 1207.
47. See Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 926 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Hatchett,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
1987]
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discriminates against state defendants. When federal actors are sued, they
can insist on exhaustion of federal administrative remedies. Conversely, state
officials are powerless to decide which forum will hear the case. The dif-
ference in treatment led Judge Roney to ask: "In terms of comity, why
should not state defendants have at least the same rights as federal defen-
dants in suits against them for alleged governmental wrongs?" ' 4
The Proposal in Practice
The insertion of an administrative exhaustion requirement into section
1983 would improve the decision-making processes of both the federal courts
and the state agencies. The proposal, however, would create some difficulties
in its application. 4'9 In many cases the adequacy of the administrative remedy
is not evident.50 Yet, the issue does not exceed the competence of federal
judges, for they are frequently called upon to determine the adequacy of
state remedie s."
The rich body of law review literature might ease some of the difficulties in
that some decision-making models have already been proposed. One sugges-
tion is a presumption that the administrative remedy is adequate, which is
rebuttable only by proof of "irreparable injury, interminable delay, excessive
expense, or bad faith harassment."5 2 Another recommendation is a practice
similar to that under the equal employment opportunity sections of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. That Act requires federal courts to defer to the states
when they "prohibit the unlawful employment practice alleged" and
"establish or authorize a state or local authority to grant or seek relief ... or
to institute criminal proceedings. ' 5 3 Regardless of which method is used, the
determination will entail some delay that is unnecessary under the current
operation of section 1983. The problem is unfortunate, but it need not create
the "procedural nightmare" predicted by some judges. 4
In any event, the proposal would alleviate many of the burdens that have
accompanied McNeese and its progeny. District judges are entitled to some
48. Id. at 912.
49. Congress has already adopted a qualified administrative exhaustion requirement for state
prisoners wishing to invoke section 1983. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-247, § 7, 94 Stat. 349, 352-53 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1982)). Under the statute,
judges have the discretion to grant a continuance of up to ninety days "in order to require ex-
haustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available." 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1982). For the remedies to be sufficient, they must meet certain procedural
safeguards. Id. §, 1997e(b)(2). Such a determination inevitably consumes some court time. See,
e.g., Owen v. Kimmel, 693 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1982). However, only a few states have filled the
statute's procedural requirements. See Lay, supra note 2, at 941-42.
50. See Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d at 925 (en banc) (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
51. Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1486, 1505 (1969).
52. Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, supra
note 36, at 555.
53. Note, supra note 51, at 1505-06.
54. See Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d at 925 (en banc) (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 40:407
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relief from the staggering number of section 1983 complaints filed every year.
The proposal to amend section 1983 provides a workable method of provid-
ing such relief without surrendering the federal judiciary's supreme respon-
sibility of vindicating federal rights.
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